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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
WILLIAM J. BROWNLEE : Case No. 981295-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that 
the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant? A "bifurcated" review standard 
applies to this issue. A trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed deferentially 
and reversed only for "clear error." See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Wright, 977 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah App. 1999). Its conclusions of law are reviewed 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for correctness, allowing some "measure of discretion" in the application of legal 
standards to the facts. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-40; Wright, 977 P.2d at 506. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of an explosive device, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995); one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to 
distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996); one 
count of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1996); and one count of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
2 
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§ 58-37-8 (1996) [R. 7-10]. Defendant was bound over after a preliminary hearing [R. 
88]. 
On August 6,1997, defendant, relying on the preliminary hearing transcript, 
moved to suppress "all evidence which the arresting and investigating officers obtained 
from the defendant and the vehicle occupied by the defendant and from the person of the 
defendant subsequent to the arrest in this case" [R. 33]. The trial court denied 
defendant's motion [R. 55]. 
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), reserving his right to appeal "the trial court's 
decision as to the police officer's probable cause for arresting the Defendant" [R. 96-97, 
137-38]. See Utah R. Cr. P. 1 l(i); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal [R. 133]. This Court remanded the case 
to the trial court for clarification that defendant had reserved his right to challenge the 
trial court's suppression ruling under Sery. The trial court provided such clarification in 
an amended order [R. 137-38]. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Voluntary encounter 
On April 5, 1996, Deputy Fountaine, of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, was 
driving near 5450 South Coliseum Court in Salt Lake County when a concerned citizen 
flagged him down and advised him that a vehicle with out-of-state license plates was 
3 
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parked around the corner and that a male was asleep in it [R. 88:6]. The concerned 
citizen identified himself to Deputy Fountaine, explained that there had been a lot of 
problems in the area, including some burglaries and thefts, and asked Deputy Fountaine 
to "check the car out and the person" [R. 88:6,18-19], 
Deputy Fountaine proceeded to the area described and found a Corvette with 
Illinois license plates parked against the curb [R. 88:6-7]. As he approached the vehicle, 
Deputy Fountaine noticed a television set on the seat, "a whole bunch of [other] 
property," and a man sleeping inside [R. 88:6-7]. It was about 9:36 a.m. [R. 88:7]. 
Several possibilities occurred to the officer: out-of-state license plates in 
conjunction with all the property inside the car alerted the officer to the possibility of 
burglary [R. 88:7], "I also wondered if possibly he had stopped because he was 
intoxicated and then fallen asleep or something" [R. 88:7]. 
Deputy Fountaine knocked on the window and woke up defendant [R. 88:8,22]. 
Deputy Fountaine then asked defendant both for identification and to roll down the 
window so that the deputy could speak with him [R. 88:8, 22]. Defendant appeared 
intoxicated: he had bloodshot eyes and acted confused [R. 88:8, 21, 23]. For about five 
minutes, Deputy Fountaine continued to request that defendant roll down his window and 
defendant continued to act confused [R. 88:8]. 
B. Detention for possible DUI supported by reasonable suspicion 
Defendant then reached for his keys; at that point, Deputy Fountaine pulled his gun 
4 
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out of his holster and put the gun on the roof of defendant's car, aiming it into the air [R. 
88:8]. Deputy Fountaine told defendant that he couldn't leave and that defendant needed 
to roll down the window or unlock or open the door so that Deputy Fountaine could talk 
with him [R. 88:8,24]. Deputy Fountaine explained: "I don't see that I have the 
obligation to let somebody drive away in a car, that was possibly intoxicated and could 
endanger other human beings"; "the jeopardy he would have imposed on-on people if I 
would have let him drive away from there, led me to feel that I had to keep him there" [R. 
88:21,23]. 
Defendant still did not roll down his window [R. 88:8]. Instead, defendant again 
reached for his keys [R. 88:8]. At that point, Deputy Fountaine brought his hand back 
and told defendant that he would break the window if defendant did not open the door [R. 
88:8-9]. Defendant then unlocked the door and the officer was able to open it [R. 88:9]. 
C. Arrest for possession of a concealed weapon 
Deputy Fountaine called for backup, and Deputy Rogers arrived about one minute 
later [R. 88:9]. Deputy Fountaine then asked defendant to step out of the car because "we 
needed to frisk him to make sure he didn't have any weapons" [R. 88:10]. As Deputy 
Fountaine began to handcuff defendant for safety and bring defendant to the deputy's car, 
Deputy Rogers saw a firearm between the seat where defendant had been sitting and the 
console [R. 88:10], About half of the firearm was visible once defendant exited the car 
[R. 88:11,25]. Upon examination, Deputy Rogers found the gun was loaded [R. 88:11]. 
5 
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Deputy Fountaine asked defendant for his name and for information on the gun [R. 
88:11]. When defendant gave Deputy Fountaine a fictitious name, Deputy Fountaine 
placed him under arrest for possession of a concealed weapon [R. 88:11-12]. 
D. Search incident to arrest 
Following defendant's arrest, Deputy Fountaine and another deputy began a more 
thorough search of defendant [R. 88:12-13]. The deputies found three pipe bombs in one 
of the fanny packs around defendant's waist and a small bag of marijuana in defendant's 
left front pocket [R. 88:12-13, 32]. A subsequent search of the car revealed two small 
bags of methamphetamine, numerous small plastic bags, more marijuana, and two pagers 
[R. 88:29]. 
E. Ruling on Motion to Suppress 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant conceded that Deputy 
Fountaine had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant to investigate defendant's 
possible intoxication when defendant first attempted to leave the scene: 
COURT: So are you thinking the probable cause was 
there to detain him to take a sobriety test or drug test there at 
the scene? 
DEFENSE: If indeed that's what was on the officer's mind 
in terms of probable cause at that point, that's what he could 
have done. 
6 
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[R. 148:15; Addendum B].1 
Before ruling on defendant's motion, the trial court clarified that defendant was 
challenging the deputy's conduct prior to defendant's actual arrest, which took place only 
after discovery of defendant's gun [R. 148:11 ]. 
In its oral ruling on defendant's motion, the trial court found: 
1. That Deputy Fountaine had reasonable suspicion to 
stop and question defendant, "the reasonable suspicion 
being that the neighbor had approached the officer and 
told him of this situation."2 
2. That "the car was parked in an area which was an 
unusual place for a person, if he's going to be taking a 
nap, to be parked." 
3. That defendant's "eyes were bloodshot." 
4. That defendant "did not roll down the window, causing 
the officer to take his gun out" because "there was the 
threat there." 
1
 An officer needs only reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime in order to detain that person. See Pp. 9, 12-16 herein. Because 
"probable cause" is a higher standard than "reasonable suspicion," defendant's 
concession that Deputy Fountaine had probable cause to detain defendant is also a 
concession that the deputy had reasonable suspicion to detain him. As is evident 
throughout the suppression hearing transcript, the trial court often applied a higher 
standard of justification to Deputy Fountaine's actions than the Fourth Amendment 
requires. See, e.g., footnote 2 herein. 
2In determining that Deputy Fountaine had reasonable suspicion to justify Deputy 
Fountaine's initial approach of defendant's vehicle, the trial court applied a higher 
standard of justification than the Fourth Amendment requires. A police officer may 
approach a parked car in a public place at any time without offending the Fourth 
Amendment. See Pp. 9, 10-11 herein. 
7 
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5. That Deputy Fountaine, "by this time, has seen other 
things in the car which led him to somewhat of a 
suspicious nature . . . a television in the back, and some 
furniture. 
6. That defendant's attempt to leave the area "causes 
questions to arise in the officer's mind." 
[R. 148:17-18; Addendum A]. Although recognizing that no one of these factors alone 
would be sufficient to uphold the detention, arrest, or search, the trial court concluded: 
7. "That an accumulation of things gives probable cause to the officer 
to approach the individual to question him and to see if he is 
deceased or some foul play has taken place."3 
8. That, after the officer revealed his gun, the confrontation "went to 
Level 2 there." 
9. That "when he tries to start the car, the officer had the right to take 
the force necessary to stop the individual from leaving the scene." 
[R. 148:17-18; Addendum A]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress where Deputy 
Fountaine's approach of a parked car on a public street did not implicate defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights; where defendant's detention thereafter was supported by 
reasonable suspicion of a possible DUI; and where his arrest was supported by probable 
cause, i.e., a concealed weapon in plain view. The subsequent searches of defendant's 
3See footnote 2. 
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person and the passenger compartment of his vehicle were proper as searches incident to 
arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE SEARCH WAS INCIDENT TO AN ARREST 
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE 
Defendant asserts that the only information that Deputy Fountaine had when he 
arrested defendant was that defendant was asleep in the driver's seat "of a vehicle legally 
parked which had personal property in it" and that, when defendant was awakened, he 
had bloodshot eyes and was confused. Aplt. Br. at 8. Defendant argues that this 
information was "not sufficient probable cause to warrant a level 3 stop as the officer did 
in the instant case." Aplt. Br. at 8. 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified three levels of constitutionally permissible 
police/citizen encounters: 
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and 
pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against 
his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop9; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been 
committed or is being committed." 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States 
v. Merritu 736 F.2d 223,230 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
9 
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Defendant's brief implies that Deputy Fountaine needed probable cause to justify 
his actions throughout his escalating encounter with defendant, see Aplt. Br. at 7-10. 
However, the deputy's encounter with defendant began as a level-one encounter, before 
escalating to a level-two and then to a level-three encounter only upon the increasingly 
suspicious nature of the circumstances. A different standard of justification applies to 
each of these levels. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18. 
Furthermore, in challenging the deputy's actions, defendant contends that "the 
confusion of defendant" alone was insufficient to support probable cause and that 
defendant's "blood shot eyes" alone were also insufficient, see Aplt. Br. at 8-9. However, 
the Utah Supreme Court has held that the reasonableness of police action "depends on the 
totality of the circumstances." Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 
1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion on the grounds that 
Deputy Fountaine's conduct throughout his encounter with defendant was in compliance 
with Deitman and the Fourth Amendment. 
A. Level-one voluntary encounter 
Deputy Fountaine's encounter with defendant began as a level-one encounter. 
Deputy Fountaine approached defendant's vehicle in response to a concerned citizen's 
request to check it out; the vehicle was unfamiliar to the citizen, had a man sleeping in it 
at 9:30 a.m., and was parked in a residential area that had recently experienced several 
10 
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burglaries and thefts [R. 88:6, 18-19]. 
Although several possibilities occurred to Deputy Fountaine as he approached 
defendant's car, he did nothing at this point to detain defendant. Deputy Fountaine 
merely knocked on defendant's window to ask defendant some questions and thereby 
allay the fears of the concerned citizen who first approached him [R.88:8,22]. 
Because Deputy Fountaine had done absolutely nothing to this point to stop 
defendant from leaving if he so chose, this initial encounter was a level-one encounter 
that did not implicate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. See State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 
984, 986 (Utah App. 1994) ("'[A] seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street and 
questions him, if the person is willing to listen.'" (quoting State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 
87-88 (Utah App. 1987)); Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617 ("6[A]n officer may approach a 
citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against 
his will.'"); Thompson v. State, 191 S.W.2d 450,452 (Ark. 1990) (holding officer's 
approach of parked car in public place "is not a 'seizure' within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment"). 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997), then, is 
misplaced. In that case, the officer instituted a level-two stop based solely on the fact that 
a vehicle was parked in an isolated area late at night. In this case, Deputy Fountaine's 
initial approach to defendant's vehicle constituted only a level-one encounter. 
11 
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B. Level-two detention supported by reasonable suspicion 
The encounter between Deputy Fountaine and defendant rose to a level-two 
encounter only when Deputy Fountaine took out his gun and told defendant not to leave 
[R. 88:8,24], See Bean, 869 P.2d at 986 (holding that level-two stop "occurs when the 
officer 'by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the 
liberty' of a person." (quoting United States v. MendenhalU 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980) 
(citation and additional internal quotation marks omitted)). A level-two encounter must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617. 
Here, Deputy Fountaine had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was 
involved in criminal activity. The deputy had approached defendant's vehicle upon the 
request of a concerned citizen [R. 88:6, 19]. The car had an out-of-state license plate and 
several items of personal property inside—including a television set—and was parked in 
a residential neighborhood which had recently been the site of numerous thefts and 
burglaries [R. 88:6,-7, 19]. The property in the car alerted the deputy to the possibility 
that defendant had been involved in a burglary [R. 88:7]. 
Deputy Fountaine also observed that defendant was asleep in the vehicle, although 
it was approximately 9:30 a.m. [R. 88:6-7]. When defendant woke up after Deputy 
Fountaine knocked on the window, Deputy Fountaine saw—in the driver's seat of a 
car—a confused man with bloodshot eyes [R. 88:8]. Furthermore, defendant's confusion 
did not dissipate, even over a relatively significant period of time, during which defendant 
12 
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did not respond to Deputy Fountaine's requests [R. 88:8, 24]. This fact alerted the deputy 
to the possibility that defendant "had stopped because he was intoxicated and then fallen 
asleep or something" and that defendant thus "could endanger other human beings" [R. 
88:7, 21]. Finally, defendant reached for his keys, from which the deputy reasonably 
inferred that defendant intended to drive away [R. 88:8,23]. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, there is reasonable suspicion to justify a detention 
if, from the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, police would reasonably 
suspect that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); see also 
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18; see also State v. Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1292-93 
(Utah App. 1998). The reasonable suspicion standard is "less demanding" than probable 
cause and requires only "some minimal level of objective justification." United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Whether there is 
some minimal level of objective justification "depends on the totality of the 
circumstances." Warden, 844 P.2d at 362 (citations omitted); see also State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); Bean, 869 P.2d at 988. 
Thus, the suspicion may be based on the observation of "unusual conduct which 
leads [the officer] reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884; see also Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 
P.2d at 1293. Although many of the facts relied upon may be "consistent with innocence, 
all that is required is that the [officer's] suspicion be 'reasonable' and 'articulable/ as 
13 
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determined by the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 
823 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 906 (1999); see also 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, §9.4(b) & n.64 (p. 
147) (3rd ed. 1996) (citing cases holding that officer need not rule out possibility of 
innocent behavior). 
Furthermore, the attempt to flee is a relevant factor. See Illinois v. Wardlow, No. 
98-1036 (U.S. January 12, 2000) (recognizing that "nervous, evasive behavior is a 
pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" and that "flight—wherever it 
occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, 
but it is certainly suggestive of such"). 
Section 41-6-44(2)(a) of the Utah Code prohibits a person from being "in actual 
physical control" of a vehicle if the person is under the influence of alcohol. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) (Supp. 1994). As this Court has noted, the purpose of this provision 
is to "enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes." Richfield City v. 
Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 91 (Utah App. 1990) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also State v. Clayton, 748 P.2d 401,403 (Idaho 1988) (stating "State's 
interest in determining whether person in control of automobile was intoxicated, before 
person had opportunity to drive in an intoxicated state, outweighed person's Fourth 
Amendment interest in being left alone" (citation omitted). 
Thus, a person can be "in actual physical control" of a motionless vehicle. See, 
14 
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e.g., Walker, 790 P.2d at 92. Factors relevant to determining whether a person is "in 
actual physical control" of a motionless vehicle include whether the person "was 
positioned in the driver's seat" and whether the person "had possession of the ignition 
key, and had the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle." Id. (citing Lopez v. 
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780-81 (Utah 1986) (holding that "as long as a person is 
physically able to assert dominion by starting the car and driving away, he has 
substantially as much control over the vehicle as he would if he were actually driving 
it")). 
As defendant conceded to the trial court in the hearing on his motion to suppress, 
the totality of the circumstances to this point was sufficient to raise at least an articulable 
suspicion that defendant had committed or was committing a DUI [R. 148:15]. Further 
detention was thus warranted. See Warden, 844 P.2d at 363 ("The Fourth Amendment's 
requirement of reasonableness is analyzed by weighing the individual's right to personal 
security against the public interest."). 
Neither State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992), nor State v. Godina-
Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992), both cited by defendant, suggest otherwise. The 
issue in Lovegren was whether continued detention was reasonable after the officer had 
already checked out the defendant's license and issued defendant a citation. See 
Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 156-58 (finding violation of Fourth Amendment where officer "did 
nothing to confirm or deny his suspicion that Defendants were under the influence of 
15 
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drugs or alcohol" and "[w]ithout any other indication of criminal activity, the officer 
simply made the decision to search the car"). The Godina-Luna court had the same 
concern. See Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 654 (holding that officer had no reasonable 
suspicion to continue to detain defendant after determining that defendant was not 
intoxicated and that identification and registration of auto disclosed "nothing amiss"). 
In this case, far from dispelling Deputy Fountaine's suspicions, defendant's 
uncooperativeness heightened them, extending the scope of the level-two detention. 
C. Scope of detention justified 
Deputy Fountaine detained defendant only as long as necessary to confirm or 
dispel his suspicions of criminal activity. Under the Fourth Amendment, "an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime" as long as the detention is "no longer than necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617; see also Rodriguez-Lopi, 
954 P.2d at 1292. "[T]he officer must diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to 
confirm or dispel the suspicions quickly." City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 170 
(Utah App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). 
In Carter, the purpose of the detention was to determine if the defendant was 
intoxicated. See Carter, 945 P.2d at 170. The defendant had rolled down the window but 
the officer still could not confirm or dispel his suspicion that defendant was under the 
influence of alcohol, since other odors were present in the car. See id. This Court held 
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that, under those circumstances, the officer's subsequent "request that defendant exit the 
vehicle was an appropriate means to quickly confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion." 
Id Cf. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (holding that officer need not 
observe actual violation to justify stop of automobile; "[shopping a vehicle may also be 
justified when the officer has 'reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is . . . 
driving under the influence of alcohol'" (citation omitted)). 
Here, as in Carter, one purpose of the initial detention was to determine if 
defendant was intoxicated. Deputy Fountaine sought to quickly dispel or confirm his 
suspicions by asking defendant to either roll down the window or open the door to the 
truck [R. 88: 8, 24]. Defendant did not roll down his window [R. 88:8]. Thus, Deputy 
Fountaine could not yet confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion that defendant was 
under the influence of alcohol. Deputy Fountaine then asked defendant to exit 
defendant's vehicle. As in Carter, that request "was an appropriate means to quickly 
confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion" and was therefore "permissible." Id4 
defendant cites to State v. James, 977 P.2d 489 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 984 
P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999), to support his claim that the search in this case was illegal. 
However, the precedential value of James is uncertain. The Utah Supreme Court has 
granted the State's petition for certiorari in that case. See State v. James, 984 P.2d 1023 
(Utah 1999). Furthermore, James is distinguishable on the facts. In James, this Court 
found that the officer "may or may not have knocked on the window, but, without 
necessarily waiting for a response, opened the door," James, 977 P.2d at 490; here, 
Deputy Fountaine repeatedly gave defendant a choice of either rolling down the window 
or opening the door [R. 88:8-9, 22, 24]. Defendant's unlocking his door rather than 
opening his window indicated his preference that contact be made through an open door 
[R. 88:9]. 
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D. Level-three arrest supported by probable cause 
The encounter rose to a level-three encounter when Deputy Fountaine arrested 
defendant. It was only the arrest—which occurred after defendant's gun was seen in 
plain sight, and after defendant provided Deputy Fountaine with a fictitious name [R. 
88:12,26; 148:11 ]—that had to be supported by probable cause. 
As discussed above, Deputy Fountaine lawfully detained defendant to determine at 
least whether defendant was intoxicated. Completion of that investigation required, at the 
least, that defendant lower his car window, or, in the alternative, exit his car. Defendant, 
by unlocking his door [R. 88:9], apparently chose the latter, at which point Deputy 
Fountaine called for backup [R. 88:9]. Deputy Rogers arrived within about one minute 
[R. 88:9]. Deputy Fountaine then asked defendant to step out of the car "to frisk him to 
make sure he didn't have any weapons" [R. 88:10]. See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (holding that "officer, for his own protection, may . . . order a 
driver out of a vehicle."). Almost immediately, Deputy Rogers identified a loaded 
firearm in plain view next to where defendant had been sitting [88:10-11, 25]. 
"A seizure is valid under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully 
present, (2) the item is in plain view, and (3) the item is clearly incriminating." State v. 
Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 357 (Utah App. 1998). Deputy Fountaine had reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant and order defendant out of his car to determine whether he 
was about to drive away while intoxicated. The officers were thus lawfully present when 
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they saw defendant's gun in plain view. See, e.g., Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135; Carter, 
945 P.2d at 170. Furthermore, the gun was clearly incriminating, especially in light of the 
television and other items of personal property in defendant's car suggesting a possible 
burglary and defendant's confused behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Hatten, 68 F.3d 
257,261 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Hidden guns, even badly hidden guns, are by their nature 
incriminating.") (and cases cited therein). Seizure of the gun was therefore justified 
under the plain view doctrine. Cf. Shepard, 955 P.2d at 357 (upholding seizure of 
corncob pipe in passenger side door which came into plain view when passenger exited 
automobile after request by officer to do so); State v. O 'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649-50 
(Utah App. 1998). 
Thus, in addition to defendant's suspicious behavior, his persistent state of 
confusion, and the items of personal property in the car in a neighborhood recently 
plagued with burglaries, defendant was carrying a concealed and loaded weapon [R. 88:6-
11]. Defendant then gave the deputies a false name [R. 88:11-12]. 
In State v. Wright, 977 P.2d 505 (Utah App. 1999), this Court explained: 
Probable cause is present when "'"the facts and circumstances 
within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they ha[ve] 
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the 
belief that" an offense has been or is being committed.'" 
Id. at 507 (quoting State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995) (other 
citations omitted)). As with reasonable suspicion, whether there is probable cause 
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depends on the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 
(Utah 1996); Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 227. In this case, the totality of the circumstances 
indicate that probable cause existed to arrest defendant [R. 88:11-12,26].5 
E. Search incident to arrest 
During a search of defendant's person subsequent to his arrest, the deputies found 
three pipe bombs in a fanny pack around defendant's waist and a bag of marijuana in his 
front pocket [R. 88:13]. A search of the passenger compartment of his car revealed 
methamphetamine, marijuana, two pagers, and numerous small plastic bags [R. 88:29]. 
"According to the rule allowing a search incident to an arrest, an arresting officer 
may, without a warrant, lawfully search the area surrounding the person he or she is 
arresting if: (1) the arrest is lawful, (2) the search is of the area within the arrestee's 
immediate control; and (3) the search is conducted contemporaneously to the arrest." 
State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1117-18 (Utah App. 1997). 
As established in Subsection D above, the arrest in this case was lawful. See Pp. 
18-20 herein. Furthermore, because a search incident to arrest may include the search 
5Defendant suggests that failure to arrest defendant for the crime originally 
suspected of forecloses the ability to arrest him for any other crime. See Aplt. Br. at 9. 
However, in light of this more immediately serious criminality, it is neither unusual nor 
improper that the deputy did not further investigate defendant's suspected intoxication. 
See, e.g., State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 
183 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220 (Utah App. 1996) (all involving 
stops pursuant to observed traffic violation where no traffic citation was ultimately issued 
due to discovery of more serious offenses). 
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both of the person actually arrested and of the passenger compartment of the automobile 
in which the person was an occupant, the search in this case was a search of the area 
within defendant's immediate control. See Giron, 943 at 1118 (holding search of 
passenger compartment is proper "even when . . . the arrested occupant of the car has 
already been handcuffed and removed from the car" (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454,460,101 S. Ct. 2860,2864 (1981))); Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 228. Finally, the 
search occurred contemporaneously with defendant's arrest [R. 88:12-14]. 
Although defendant argues that the evidence taken from his person and his car is 
inadmissible because the searches were illegal, both searches were valid as searches 
incident to defendant's arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State requests that the Court affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress below. 
M 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED^ January 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCjklK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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man and question him, because he suspected him to be 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, he would have 
given him a field sobriety test and asked him to take 
a blood or urine test. 
THE COURT: Does he have probable cause to 
unholster his gun and detain him when he tried to 
start the car? 
MR. MCCOY: Well, to tell you the truth, I 
don't think he did. Because no crime had been 
committed. There's no evidence that any crime had 
been committed. There isn't anything there. I mean 
this is a casual encounter that isn't -- the guy 
doesn't want to talk to him. That's all I have. 
THE COURT: You're standing, Mr. Lemcke. If 
I allow you, then I'd have to allow Mr. McCoy. I 
would indicate to you, counsel, that I have read your 
memoranda, and I have read the cases submitted by Mr. 
McCoy, and the court was somewhat familiar with some 
of these cases. And of course I've dealt with 
probable-cause type cases many times. 
And it's always a close question -- well, 
not always, but I'd say an awful lot of cases that are 
close. And of course in the Struts case, it does give 
the three situations as far as the levels of stopping. 
And the court would find that an officer 
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does have the right, under reasonable suspicion, to 
stop and question an individual, the reasonable 
suspicion being that the neighbor had approached the 
officer and told him of this situation. 
Now, I guess the neighbor said, "The man is 
sleeping in the car," I guess the neighbor didn't 
know if he was sleeping or if he was dead or what the 
situation was. 
But the car was parked in an area which was 
an unusual place for a person, if he's going to be 
taking a nap, to be parked. I'm not saying that if a 
person wants to take a nap in a residential area that 
he doesn't have a right to, but I'm saying that an 
accumulation of things gives probable cause to the 
officer to approach the individual to question him and 
to see if he is deceased or some foul play has taken 
place. 
When he approached him, the person awakened. 
His eyes were bloodshot. I don't think bloodshot eyes 
were sufficient. I know it's not, in and of itself, 
to be sufficient. 
But the person did not roll down the window, 
causing the officer to take his gun out. He didn't 
point the gun at him at that point, but I think there 
was the threat there, the evidence of fear on the part 
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of the officer as he took his gun out and held it on 
the roof of the car. 
I'm sure the defendant saw the gun, and I'm 
sure that was the intent of the officer; the intent 
being to want him to roll down the window and not 
start the car and not leave. 
I think it went to Level 2 there, as I think 
both counsel argued. I think that when he tries to 
start the car, the officer had the right to take the 
force necessary to stop the individual from leaving 
the scene. He also, by that time, has seen other 
things in the car which led him to somewhat of a 
suspicious nature; but that itself would not be 
sufficient, if he had just seen a television in the 
back, and some furniture. Maybe he's moving. 
But he tries to leave the area, in which 
case it causes questions to arise in the officer's 
mind. The court finds -- first of all, let me 
indicate that there are some close situations here, 
but I do find that the officer had probable cause to 
question the individual. He had probable cause to 
detain the individual. 
Upon the individual trying to leave, he had 
probable cause to then take him into custody, to 
search the car, and to arrest him, with the evidence 
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that he found. 
The court would find in favor of the State, 
denying the defendant's motion to suppress the 
evidence, and allow the evidence to be used at the 
time of trial. Any questions? 
MR. MCCOY: No. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Counsel, we have a trial date 
coming up. Keep me informed. I do have other matters 
and situations. Keep me informed as to what's taking 
place. Thank you, counsel. 
MR. LEMCKE: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the instant proceedings came to 
a close.) 
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test or urine test. He didn't do it. 
I ' in say iiig Lhat his lac k <,» t do i ng t h.a t s hows 
his real intent that morning. That's what is 
i e 1 e v a n t „ IHI e d i d n L h a v e I;: 11 e i n t e n I o £ s I; o p p i n g t h I s 
man for a DUI or drug-related driving offense, or he 
wo u 1 d h a v e p in I h 1 in t h r. o u g 11 a o b i i ety t, e s L s a n d asked 
him to then take a blood test. He didn't do that. 
TH E! C0LIRT : So a re y'o u t. h Inking the probable 
cause was there to detain him _ _ take a sobriety test 
drug test there at the scene? 
MR. MCCOY: If indeed that's what was on the 
officer's mi nd in terms of probable cause at that 
point, that's what he could have done. 
THE C0UR1 : But if that was not on his mind, 
if he had no intention of stopping for that purpose, 
does he have the right to stop and question him at the 
point that he did, and then do what followed? 
MR MCCOY: fm saying that I don't think he 
had -- that that was in his mind that morning. He 
just wanted to talk to him, and I don't think that 
this business of bloodshot eyes or nervousness has 
any thing t o d o w 11 h t: h is case as far as a practical 
matter. 
And that morning, the officer is truly -- If 
he truly thought he had probable cause wO stop this 
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